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Abstract: 
Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a divergence over time in income 
distributions across countries and within countries.  In this paper we study a simple 
dynamic general equilibrium model of technology adoption which is consistent with 
these stylized facts.  In our model, growth is endogenous, and agents are assumed 
to be heterogeneous in their initial holdings of wealth and capital.  We find that in 
the presence of barriers or costs associated with the adoption of more productive 
technologies, inequalities in wealth and income may increase over time tending to 
delay the convergence in international income differences.  The model is also 
capable of explaining the observed diversity in the growth pattern of transitional 
economies.  According to the model, this diversity may be the result of variability in 









Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a divergence over time in income 
distributions across countries and within countries.  For example, based on the work 
of Quah (1996, 1997), there is strong evidence to suggest an emergence of “twin-
peaks” in cross-sectional world income distributions.  There is also substantial 
evidence to suggest that this type of polarization is present in income distributions 
within countries. (See, for example, Sala-i-Martin 2006, Jappelli and Pistaferri 2000, 
Piketty and Saez 20031, and Schluter 1998, among others).  Typically the empirics of 
economic growth support Baumol’s (1986) idea of “convergence clubs” emerging 
across and within countries.   
   Furthermore, Pritchett (1997) suggests that the growth patterns of countries that 
fall into the “developing economies” category exhibit a great deal of diversity.   For 
example, some of these countries converge rapidly on the leaders, while others 
stagnate, or even experience reversals and declines in their growth processes.   
Pritchett cites the experience of Mozambique (-2.2 percent per annum), and Guyana 
(-0.7 percent per annum), as examples from a group of 16 developing economies 
which experienced negative growth rates in the period 1960 – 1992. 
      There is a large theoretical and empirical literature that seeks to explain cross 
country income differences. (For a collection of representative literature see 
Acemoglu 2004a, 2004b.)  An interesting strand within this literature looks at the 
implications of technology adoption and the consequent structural change associated 
with the process of growth and development.  Recent efforts in this direction, (e.g., 
Hansen and Prescott, 2002, Ngai, 2004, Parente and Prescott, 2004), suggest 
barriers to adopting more productive technologies as an explanation for cross-
country income differences.  There are studies that also suggest that inequalities in 
initial income distributions have a bearing on the issue of technology adoption.  For 
example, in the work of Horii et al. (2005) credit market imperfections, in 
conjunction with inequality prevents the adoption of more capital-intensive 
technologies.  In a model with an exogenous, fixed cost of adopting technology, Khan 
and Ravikumar (2001), show that income inequality within a country increases over 
time.   
   The model of this paper is similar in sprit to the literature on technology adoption 
discussed above.  We construct a two-period overlapping generations model with 
heterogeneity in the levels of initial wealth and capital, and two available  
 
 
technologies.  One of these technologies is associated with a fixed cost of adoption, 
but is much more productive than the other technology, which does not entail any 
costs of adoption.  In our model there is a threshold level of capital for which the 
households in the economy switch to the more productive technology.  The threshold 
level of capital is monotonically declining in the level of wealth of the household, a 
feature that is consistent with empirical evidence. (See for example, Wozniak 1987, 
Alauddin and Tisdell, 1991).   We find that assumptions about the initial distribution 
can have very different implications for the date in which all households in the 
economy adopt the better technology.  Inequality can therefore increase and remain 
persistent for very long periods of time, consequently delaying the process of 
structural transformation that is associated with development.  Furthermore, this 
feature also has significant implications for divergence in incomes across countries. 
      We also conduct some thought experiments which allow some variability in the 
fixed cost of adoption across different time periods.  Our experiments indicate that 
either variable or increasing adoption costs delay the process of transition to higher 
growth rates.  Variability in adoption costs also has the effect of producing reversals 
in the growth process, a characteristic that has been observed in the case of several 
developing economies. 
   Another set of numerical experiments with our model involve assumptions about 
the level of inequality of the initial distributions of capital and wealth.  We find that 
higher levels of initial inequality delay the process of transition and also lead to a 
higher level of inequality in the post-transitional distribution of income. 
  An interesting feature of the model revealed by our experiments is the diversity of 
growth patterns observed for different cohorts of households in the economy.     
Household dynasties positioned at the “rich”, “poor”, or median levels of the income 
distribution are all capable of experiencing reversals in the growth of income over 
time.  The time of these reversals, which are temporary appear to be related to the 
timing of technology adoption, which is, of course, different across various income 
groups. 
   In the section that follows we describe the economic environment, which has some 
features in common with the model of Khan and Ravikumar (2001).  Section 3 
presents the results based on various numerical simulations of this model.  Section 4 
concludes. 
 2. The economic environment 
The economy consists of two-period lived overlapping generations of agents who are 
heterogeneous in their holdings of wealth and capital, and have perfect foresight.   
Time is discrete, with t = 0, 1, 2, …, and we assume that the initial distributions of 
capital and wealth are described by F( . ), and G( . ) respectively.  Preferences of an 
agent in born in period t are described as follows: 
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Here,    and  denote the agents consumption in the first and second period of 
life,  represents bequests left to the next generation.  In order to produce output 
individuals have to decide on adoption of one of two technologies, which will be 
henceforth referred to as Technology A and Technology B.  Technology A is 
associated with lower productivity but does not involve any adoption costs.  It is 
given by  
t C 1 + t C
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where   represents the period t composite human and physical capital stock held by 
old agents and supplied to the young for production.  Technology B is more 
productive than Technology A, but involves a cost of adoption.  It is therefore 
characterized by  
t K
                            0 , , > > − = δ δ A B BK Y t t , 
where  δ represents the fixed cost of adopting Technology B.  Households adopting 
Technology A face the following budget constraints: 
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Households adopting Technology B, on the other hand, face  the  constraints:       
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In the equations above   and   refer to the rate of return on capital enjoyed by 
agents who had adopted technologies A and B respectively when they were young.  
The superscripts A and B applied to the other variables have an analogous 
interpretation.  Note the “AK” structure of production functions we have assumed 
here is typically known to generate non- convergence in incomes across countries.  
See for example Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, (1992) and references therein.  
A
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    Note that the model here has a structure similar to that of Khan and Ravikumar 
(2001), but with the key difference that a two-period overlapping-generations 
structure has been assumed
1.  Furthermore, we have an additional state variable in 
the form of bequests   left over from the previous generation, which can also cause 
inequalities to persist over time. 
t W
      Agents using technology A maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3).  The implied 
optimal plans for consumption, capital accumulation and bequests are: 
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Likewise we can show that agents who adopt B will have: 
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   It is clear that agents will adopt technology B iff 
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Where   and   represent the indirect utility functions for agents adopting the A 




Proposition 1:  Let  ,
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.  For a given level of 
wealth   a household will adopt technology B iff  .  t W
*
t t K K ≥
                                                      
 
1 Khan and Ravikumar consider an infinite horizon model with non-overlapping generations and a one-
time adoption cost, after which the old technology is never used.   In our model, each generation faces a 
technology adoption problem, even if the previous generation belonging to the same cohort had adopted 
the B technology. 
 
     
   The above proposition defines a threshold level of capital required for a household 
with wealth   to find it worthwhile to adopt the more productive technology B.   
Alternatively we could have defined a threshold level of wealth needed to adopt the B 
technology for a given level of capital stock.  The equations of Proposition 1 in fact 
define a “frontier” represented by a locus of combinations of wealth and capital that 
make the switch to technology B possible.  As illustrated by Figure 1, this frontier 
shifts to the right in (K, W) space as the cost of adoption 
t W
δ increases.  Since 1 < λ , 
higher levels of wealth are associated with lower levels of the threshold capital stock.  





Figure 1: Frontier of initial wealth and critical capital for different adoption costs. 
 
      The dynamics of this model are then described by the following system of first 
order difference equations 







)) 1 ( 1 (
) 1 (
.














































)) 1 ( 1 (
) 1 (
.











































 where   ,









=  with  λ  defined as in Proposition 1.  Note that the threshold 
level of capital varies over time, which makes it difficult to characterize the dynamics 
of the system analytically.  However, simply by inspecting the system we can draw 
on some intuitive insights.  We know that before reaching the threshold level of 
capital stock the dynamics are determined by the first two equations; these dynamics 
are likely to be stable if the coefficients multiplying   and   are positive and less 
than 1.  For plausible values of parameters, we would expect that this would indeed 
be the case.  In the numerical simulations reported in the following sections, for most 
of the experiments we assume the following parameter values. 
t K t W
Table 1: Parameter values 
β   θ   A  B   δ  
.99  1 1 3 20 
 
Note that , and  , since under competitive conditions inputs are paid 
according to their marginal contributions to output.  We have also conducted several 
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2.   We do however report results relating to the variation of the adoption cost 
parameter, δ as these are significantly relevant to our analysis. 
   Of course, the coefficient of   in the second set of equations is greater than 1 for 
the above combination of parameter values.  However, even if this coefficient is less 
than 1, which can be ensured by choosing an appropriately smaller value for the 
altruism parameter 
t W
θ , our results do not appear to change in a qualitative sense. The 
system invariably involves a dynamic process whereby all households in the economy 
eventually adopt the more productive technology.  As this is an endogenous growth 
model, the economy is on a balanced growth path in which all variables grow at a 
constant rate over time.  The date of transition to the better technology is however 
sensitive to the adoption cost parameter. 
   In what follows, we report results of various numerical experiments that involve 
varying some of the parameters of the model and the initial distributions of capital 
and wealth.  We focus our attention on the consequences of these experiments for 
the date of transition to higher growth rates, and the evolution of inequality within 
the economy over time.  An obvious by-product of these experiments is the 
                                                      
 
2 Results are available upon request. 
 
 implication for cross-country income differences and inequality in the world income 
distribution.  We also examine the pattern of growth rates of various aggregates such 
as savings, per capita output, consumption and bequests over time.  These patterns 
show a significant amount of diversity across different cohorts of households.  We 
therefore also report these patterns for households that are in the lowest 20%, the 
highest 20%, and the mean and median positions in the income distribution. 
 
3. Results of quantitative experiments 
In the first experiment we examine the implications of the parameter combination in 
Table 1 for the transition process of the economy towards the adoption of Technology 
B.  The total number of household in the sample is 501
3.  In Figure 2 we report how 
the number of households adopting Technology A, and the number adopting 
Technology B, evolve over time.  For example the number of households adopting 
Technology B is represented by the increasing sequence of 2, 32, 129, 287, 420, 
478, 495, and 501.  The initial distributions of capital and wealth are assumed to be 
lognormal with mean 3.6 and variance 1.2, with the adoption cost parameter  20 = δ .  
In Figure 2 it is clear that all households adopt technology at date  .  Note that 
our model has a two-period overlapping-generations structure in which a single 
period is interpreted as approximately 35 years. (See for example Hansen and 
Prescott, 2001).  Effectively, therefore, this means that the households completely 




                                                      
 
3 Results do not change qualitatively for larger samples – i.e. the date at which all households adopt B 
seems to be invariant to the number of households in the initial distribution.  Note that since we do not 
have population growth in this model, the total number of households remains constant over time. 
 
  
Figure 2: Number of households adopting Technology A or B in different time 
periods. 
 
3.1.  Experiments with the adoption-cost parameter δ   
   In Figure 3 we examine the effect of increasing the fixed cost of adoption on the 
date at which all households shift to using Technology B. We consider values of δ  set 
equal to 20, 25, 30, 35.  As illustrated in the Figure the corresponding dates of 
transition 
* T  are equal to 8, 9, 10, 14 respectively.  In terms of our model this 
implies complete adoption after 280, 315, 350, and 490 years respectively.  Higher 
adoption costs are interpreted to be the result of institutional or structural features 
that have not been explicitly modeled here.  However, the implication for cross 
country differences in income is obvious.  Furthermore, another implication for 
countries facing high adoption cost pertains to the level of inequality in the income 
distribution after the transition takes place.  For example in Figure 4 we examine the 
Gini coefficients of capital and wealth over t i m e  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  a d o p t i o n  c o s t s .   I t  
appears that the level of inequality of the post-transition capital and wealth 






Figure 3: Number of households adopting Technology A or B in different time 




Figure 4: Gini coefficients of capital and wealth over time for different adoption 
costs. 
   
The results above motivate some simple thought experiments.  That is, based on the 
impact of the magnitude of adoption costs on transition dates and inequality levels 
eventually attained, it is of interest to examine the effect of (a) adoption costs that 
 
 
 vary  randomly over time, and (b) adoption costs that increase over time.  These 
experiments are further motivated by the idea that the growth experience of 
transitional economies in cross-country data exhibits a lot of diversity.  Pritchett 
(1997) suggests that while some countries that fall in the category of “developing 
economies” have experienced rapid growth and convergence to higher income levels, 
others have experienced an interruption of the growth process manifested in the 
form of stagnation or even reversals.   
   In Figure 5(a) we examine the impact of adoption costs that vary randomly over 
time.  We constructed the adoption cost series by using a uniform random number 
generator with a transformation that generated positive values of δ  between 10 and 
60.  We find that although there are some reversals in the adoption process during 
the transition period, eventually complete adoption takes place.  The variability of 
adoption costs appear to impact significantly on the date of eventual transformation.  
The experiment therefore indicates that varying adoption costs may be a potential 
candidate for explaining reversals in growth process that has been experienced by 
some developing economies.  Note that we assume that there is no uncertainty 
associated with the household’s technology adoption decision – the decision to adopt 
a particular technology is taken after the cost is observed by the household.  An 
interesting extension of the model would entail considering a “risky” technology 
adoption decision whereby the costs are observed after the adoption decision takes 
place, and only the distribution of adoption costs is known. 
   
I n  F i g u r e  5 ( b )  w e  l o o k  a t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  adoption costs over time.  We consider 
experiments in which adoption costs grow at a rate of 10%, 15%, and 20% over 
time, starting at a minimum value of 20.  Again, we emphasize that this is simply a 
thought experiment based on a somewhat “ad-hoc” process for adoption costs.   
Ideally, the variability in adoption costs should be modeled as a process that is 
endogenous in the sense that it arises due to some institutional or structural features 
characteristic of developing economies, and that is explicitly modeled into the 
framework.  However, our purpose here is simply to explore whether this may be 
fruitful direction of research.  To that end, the results reported in Figure 5(b) appear 
to support the idea that this may indeed be the case.  Increasing adoption costs 
appear to significantly delay the process of complete adoption.  For example 
 
 
 corresponding to the adoption-cost growth rates mentioned above the transition to 
Technology B takes place approximately after 420, 455, and 525 years respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5(a): Impact of variability in adoption costs over time. 
 
Figure 5(b): Impact of increases in adoption costs over time. 
 
3.2. Experiments that vary initial inequality levels 
      Next we consider the implications for varying levels of inequality in the initial 
distributions of wealth and capital, on the date of transition and eventual inequality 
levels.  Figure 6(a) reports four panels which correspond to four different initial 
distributions that are essentially mean-preserving spreads of the distribution 
 
 
 corresponding to Figure 1.  That is the mean of all of the initial distributions is 3.6 
with variances given by 1.2, 2, 2.6, 3.2 respectively.  (The corresponding Gini 
coefficients of the initial distribution of wealth are: 0.1586, 0.2149, 0.2371, and 
0.2741 respectively).  It seems that higher the level of initial inequality, later the 
date of complete adoption of Technology B.  In Figure 6(b) we consider the impact on 
inequality levels in the post-transitional distributions of wealth and capital.  (The 
initial levels of inequality are identical to those corresponding to the experiment in 
Figure 6(a)).  Here, we find that higher levels of initial inequality translate into higher 
levels of post-transitional inequality. 
 
 
Figure 6 (a): Number of households adopting Technology A or B in different time 
periods with varying levels of initial inequality. 
 
  The results corresponding to Figures 6(a) and 6(b) have an interesting implication 
for future directions of research.  Since the process of transition has such stark 
distributional implications political economy issues cannot be ignored.  It is for 
example, reasonable to argue that social and political conflict may ensue in the 
process of transition leading to an interruption of the process.  This issue is 





Figure 6 (b): Gini coefficients of wealth and capital in different time periods with 
varying levels of initial inequality. 
 
3.3.  Growth patterns across different cohorts in the income distribution 
Figures 7(a), 7(b) and 7(c) examine the patterns in the evolution of wealth, saving, 
output, and consumption over time across different groups of household.  Figures 
7(a) and 7(b) looks at the rate of growth of these aggregates for the median of the 
income distribution, and the “average” household respectively.  Figure 7(c) looks at 
the growth rate these variables for the richest 20% and poorest 20% of the 
households in the economy.  The striking aspect of these figures is that the growth 
pattern for different cohorts of households is very diverse.  For example, the timing 
of complete adoption, and the timing of reversals and upswings in the growth process 
vary significantly across different groups.  Furthermore, in some cases the pattern of 
growth is monotonic, while it is non-monotonic for others. One may in fact infer that 
this characteristic would also translate into a corresponding diversity in the 
experiences of countries that are in different positions in the world distribution of 
income.  This feature of the model suggests that multi-country extension of this 
model similar in spirit to the framework considered in Basu and Weil (1998) with 
different income distributions across countries and a sequence of technologies with 
varying levels of productivity might yield a diversity of patterns that have been 




Figure 7(a):  Average growth rates of variables in the economy 
 
 









4. Concluding remarks 
Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a divergence over time in income 
distributions across countries and within countries.  In this paper we study a simple 
dynamic general equilibrium model of technology adoption which is consistent with 
these stylized facts.  In our model, growth is endogenous, and agents are assumed 
to be heterogeneous in their initial holdings of wealth and capital.  We find that in the 
presence of barriers or costs associated with the adoption of more productive 
technologies, inequalities in wealth and income may increase over time tending to 
delay the convergence in international income differences.  The model is also capable 
of explaining the observed diversity in the growth pattern of transitional economies.  
According to the model, this diversity may be the result of variability in adoption 
costs, or the relative position of a transitional economy in the world income 
distribution. 
  Some of our quantitative experiments suggest some interesting directions for future 
research.  Ideally, the variability in adoption costs should be modeled as a process 
that is endogenous in the sense that it arises due to some institutional or structural 






the framework.  Furthermore, the inequalities that result from the process of 
transition indicate that political economy issues would also have a bearing on these 
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